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Parties to peace agreements have long considered human rights as central to the consolidation 
of peace and democracy in post-conflict settings. Yet, understanding of the formal institutional 
mechanisms that peace processes put in place to promote and protect human rights is rather 
limited. This article informs this gap using an original multi-level analysis of 126 peace 
agreements and three main categories of institutions involved in securing human rights 
implementation after conflict – international and regional institutions for promoting and 
protecting rights, as well as national human rights ombudsmen and commissions. We find that 
peace agreements localise human rights implementation after the end of conflict, relying more 
on national human rights institutions than international ones to monitor and implement human 
rights domestically and assist national executives with processes of transition away from 
conflict and toward liberal democracy. While regional and international institutions like the 
United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe are included in 
some peace agreements, their roles are much more limited and nearly exclusively aimed at 
offering support to new and existing national human rights commissions. We illustrate our 
analysis with two case studies of peace agreements in Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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Since the Cold War, peace processes and peace agreements have increasingly become key 
mechanisms to end wars and create lasting peace and security. The success of peace agreements 
depends to a large extent on their ability to foresee possible future problems and to define at 
least a pathway capable of addressing them1.2 To this end, human rights provisions have 
become central to many peace processes and peace agreements, motivating transitional justice 
work and institutional building as part of liberal democratisation processes.3 To safeguard the 
enforcement of human rights commitments, peace agreements now often incorporate multiple 
implementation mechanisms and strategies.  
 Scholars and practitioners have offered important insights into the evolution of human 
rights and peacebuilding as well as the value and pitfalls of human rights for peace processes 
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and peace agreements4. Our understanding of the concrete ways which peace agreements 
propose to secure the implementation of human rights provisions and to guarantee that specific 
implementation mechanisms contribute to peace is far from complete. Be they multinational 
institutions such as the United Nations (UN), organisations with regional scope of membership 
like the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or national human 
rights institutions (NHRIs), formal institutions with mandates that include human rights 
promotion and protection have played key roles in monitoring and aiding national governments 
with the implementation of human rights commitments made in peace agreements. Legal and 
international politics scholars have written on the significant roles that national human rights 
institutions play in protecting rights domestically, and the role that international institutions 
play in the cross-border diffusion and the implementation of human rights norms. Yet, we have 
much to learn about the roles that formal national, regional, and international institutions with 
human rights remits play in the efforts to end conflict and bring about peace through peace 
agreements. 
In this article, we examine the ways in which human rights are institutionalized during 
peacebuilding efforts through the inclusion in peace agreements of formal institutions 
mandated to monitor, implement, and promote human rights. Our analysis explores what type 
of human rights institutions – international, regional, or national – are most common and why, 
and discusses what specific functions peace agreements prescribe to human rights institutions, 
showing how these institutional choices posit human rights as playing a central role in the 
construction of political settlements. As our analysis will show, NHRIs, such as human rights 
commissions and ombudsmen, are the most prevalent formal bodies with human rights 
mandates in peace agreements. Through their work, they are seen as key contributors to 
democratization processes, the promotion of respect for the rule of law and the transition to 
durable peace.5 The prevalence of NHRIs as the institutional mechanism used to implement 
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human rights provisions compared to regional and international human rights institutions 
demonstrates the importance of local and national human rights mechanisms as principle 
implementing actors even if they are drawing on international human rights standards in their 
mandates. Although a number of academic studies have offered valuable insights into the ways 
in which NHRIs operate in conflict contexts6, most evidence to date is not comparative in 
nature and is largely based on country and institutional case studies.  
 Our analysis makes use of data from the PA-X peace agreements database, to identify 
and code the different roles that peace agreements grant to human rights institutions and the 
different types of human rights institutions that are prescribed in agreements.7 There are 1518 
peace agreements in Version 1 of the PA-X database; of those 99 mention a national human 
rights institution, and 44 mention a regional or international human rights institution.8 There is 
some overlap with agreements that contain provisions for national as well as regional and 
international institutions, and in total, we analyse 126 agreements. Agreements that include 
provisions related to human rights institutions span every region and time frame from the 
Cambodia agreements in the early 1990s to much more recent agreements in Syria and Yemen. 
We use qualitative content analysis to investigate the varied functions human rights institutions 
are mandated to provide across the large sample of peace agreements. We complement the 
analysis of textual data with two case studies focusing on peace processes in two countries – 
Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In our case studies, we seek to assess also whether 
formal human rights institutions included in peace agreements live up to expectations set up 
by participants in the peace negotiation processes. 
We find that peace agreements rely primarily on NHRIs and to a lesser extent on 
international human rights institutions as part of peace implementation processes. A few 
regional institutions have played key roles in a small number of cases – for instance, the OSCE 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the regional body that supports human rights monitoring efforts 
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and the creation of an NHRI. Overall, regional institutions are mentioned in a small number of 
cases and are rarely used to implement human rights commitments found in the agreements. 
However, negotiating parties in peace agreements prioritise the creation of NHRIs over other 
forms of institutionalisation of human rights protection. To that end, peace agreements provide 
more formal safeguards for NHRIs, as opposed to regional or global institutions. When 
functional, NHRIs can monitor government action and report on continued human rights 
violations. They can be instrumental in advising government on the domestic implementation 
of international human rights law and the system of international human rights treaties the state 
can join. In addition, they are formal structures that seek to safeguard the local implementation 
of liberal norms and advance the implementation of peace by supporting transitions to 
democracy. Despite being increasingly important actors on the domestic stage, as sole 
independent bodies charged with human rights promotion and protection, we have much to 
learn about the work that these bodies carry out in conflict and post-conflict settings.  
Our study seeks to contribute to the scholarship on peacebuilding and human rights, by 
providing insights into the main roles that formal human rights institutions included in peace 
agreements play to implement human rights provisions and promote sustainable peace through 
the advancement of liberal democratic norms. There are varying views on what to prioritize in 
peace processes and peace agreements with a focus on conflict resolution, stressing an end to 
large-scale violence, while maintaining a focus on human rights and advocating for justice as 
necessary conditions to achieve peace. Mertus has stressed that these two approaches are far 
more complementary than conflictual as both ultimately seek to maximise human dignity and 
minimise harm,9 and the inclusion of human rights institutions in peace agreements is a 
manifestation of an approach that seeks to end violence while also creating mechanisms that 
will foster a sustainable and just peace. Peacebuilding literature and practice furthermore 
highlight the importance of these sorts of structures to solidify peace.10 Our study examines 
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how peacebuilding theory can be operationalised in peace agreements. Our data show that 
human rights implementation in post-conflict settings is largely viewed as a localised process, 
as peace agreements rely on NHRIs to implement human rights provisions with some support 
from international organisations primarily at the start. Establishing an NHRI can also be seen 
as an important signal that states can send to the international community of liberal democratic 
states about their intention to respect human rights and, ultimately, implement peace and 
transition to liberal democracy. 
While existing research has offered valuable insights into the choices governments 
make to establish NHRIs and to grant them certain structural designs,11 our understanding of 
the roles that peace agreements play in the creation and design of human rights institutions is 
very limited. Our study addresses this gap by offering a systematic analysis of all provisions 
that create NHRIs or utilise formal international or regional institutions and endow them with 
protection powers that respond to problems endemic in post-conflict contexts. We illustrate our 
analysis based on quantitative data with two case studies – Cambodia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – where peace agreements specify different roles for international, regional and 
national human rights institutions in peace implementation processes. Given the prevalence of 
human rights institutions among institutions charged with human rights monitoring in peace 
agreements, our two cases vary in their creation of a human rights institution. While the 
Institution of the Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina was created with 
international support and played a crucial role in the post-conflict context of transition to 
democracy, the peace agreement in Cambodia relied exclusively on the intervention of 
international institutions for safeguarding the protection of human rights in the post-conflict 
period. 
In what follows, we introduce briefly the different types of institutions charged with 
human rights promotion and protection at the international, regional, and national levels, 
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focusing on the main formal bodies that are central to human rights implementation and 
monitoring in post-conflict settings. We also review the existing literature examining the use 
of human rights institutions in peace agreements and situate our own contribution. We then 
map out and analyse how human rights institutions at three distinct levels of the international 
systems have been used in peace agreements from 1990 to 2015 and through case studies 
discuss their impact on the institutionalization of human rights in the conflict area.  
 
Human Rights Institutions and Peacebuilding 
 
At its core, peacebuilding consists of a set of processes aimed at supporting and solidifying 
peace. More recently, peacebuilding has also come to be associated with specific interventions 
to support democratization, economic growth, good governance, institutions, and human 
rights.12 Similarly, our understanding of human rights has developed from a framework 
intended for the protection of individuals to incorporate the promotion of dignity and social 
justice.13 As conceptions of human rights and peacebuilding have expanded, the incorporation 
of human rights into peace processes has also evolved. The immediate post-Cold War period 
from 1990-2000 was an era of experimentation with approaches to human rights and resolving 
conflicts that pushed back against the notion that the main issue in peace negotiations was 
reaching an agreement, and any normative concerns came second.14 The decade from 2000-
2010 saw an increased institutionalization of human rights in peacebuilding, and the expansion 
of a peacebuilding architecture and international legal system embraced and often prioritized 
human rights.15 Finally, most recently, we have witnessed an era of disillusionment, motivated 
by a focus on the failure of peacebuilding as well as the re-examination of several perceived 
successes, such as Bosnia and Burundi.16  
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 Human rights are essential for peace with justice, as they contribute to more sustainable 
responses to structural violence and set the preconditions for peace.17 The link between conflict 
resolution and human rights is complex and fluid, responding to transformations in the nature 
of violent conflict and also to changes in the relationship between peace and justice, which has 
moved away from competition and increasingly more in the direction of partnership.18 Even 
so, it is important to note that, human rights can be seen as controversial in states affected by 
conflict and have recently been side-lined as a result of a broader loss of legitimacy for liberal 
forms of peacebuilding.19 Nevertheless, human rights impact all stages of conflict. During the 
intensification of conflict, human rights violations are often one of the causes of conflict and 
failure to address them contributes to the intensification of conflict and the failure of prevention 
efforts. During armed conflicts, human rights violations can be both an inevitable consequence 
of violence and a component of wartime strategy, as well as inform international interventions 
in conflicts. At the stage of conflict resolution, the mechanisms that peace agreements put in 
place to implement human rights, with the aim to change patterns of destructive relationships 
and generate healthier patterns of interaction, are key to the sustainability of peace.20 
Furthermore, the application of human rights principles can assist with processes of negotiation 
about the formation of government and other societal and political issues that go beyond the 
realm of rights.21  
In an effort to build in human rights to peace agreements and thus contribute to 
sustainable peace, parties participating in negotiations often build in safeguards for human 
rights enforcement, by calling on existing international, regional, and national institutions to 
provide assistance or by creating new national and local institutions mandated with monitoring 
and implementing human rights. How and to what effect for post-war peace, are human rights 
institutions provisions integrated in peace agreements? To address this twofold question, we 
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begin with a discussion of the main types of human rights institutions – international, regional, 
or national – most commonly included in peace agreement. 
 
Institutions for human rights – a brief historical overview 
 
International and regional institutions for human rights 
At the international level, the UN, primarily through the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), is arguably the most prominent actor that has increasingly sought to 
advance the promotion and protection of human rights. OHCHR supports NHRIs through the 
Paris Principles, which set the framework for NHRI accreditation and promotion.22 It also 
monitors human rights in specific countries and around particular thematic issues and can 
utilise special procedures to appoint special rapporteurs, independent experts, and working 
groups. As will be discussed in the case of Cambodia, the impetus to utilise special procedures 
can come from peace agreements.23 At the regional level, different parts of the world have 
created specific formal instruments for the promotion and protection of human rights. Europe 
is the region with the most developed institutional architecture of human rights promotion and 
protection. The Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Human Rights and 
established the European Court of Human Rights as a powerful formal instrument of complaint 
handling and legal enforcement.24 In addition, the European Union (EU) and the OSCE have 
incorporated human rights in their work through an expansive system that seeks to impose 
common regional human rights standards.25 These policies are clearly exhibited through efforts 
to secure peace and consolidate democracy and political stability in post-conflict settings in 
former Yugoslavia and in states that are members of the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Africa has a comparatively less effective regional architecture of human rights 
institutions. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the African Charter on Human 
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and Peoples’ Rights and established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights26, 
and its successor organization, the African Union (AU), has continued this work by integrating 
human rights norms into its constitutive documents and creating additional institutions, such 
as the African Peer Review Mechanism as an institution to evaluate state compliance with 
human rights and other principles.27 There has been a significant shift in the human rights and 
peace and security norms and institutions from the OAU to the AU.28 This has meant stronger 
structures and policies to manage conflict on the continent and at the same time promote human 
rights, but it has not necessarily translated into increased effectiveness.  
 The work done by regional organisations to end conflict and support human rights 
through an end to violent conflict and the promotion of human rights standards in their regional 
spheres is important, and many regions have at least some institutional bodies that address 
human rights and violent conflict. Despite that, as our analysis will show, peace agreements 
rarely specify the key roles that formal regional institutions play in implementing human rights 
provisions in post-conflict settings. Rather, peace settlements envision regional institutions 
primarily as bodies with important supporting roles in relation to domestic and local actors, or 
regional organisations support peace agreements in broader ways, for example, through acting 
as a guarantor or providing mediation support, and not specifically in supporting 
implementation of human rights provisions.  
 
National Human Rights Institutions  
Since the early 1990s, the international community, endorsed by the UN, established NHRIs 
as a novel institutional solution to implementing domestic human rights commitments. NHRIs 
are independent regulatory bodies, such as human rights commissions or ombudsmen, 
mandated to facilitate the independent implementation of international human rights norms in 
domestic policymaking.29 NHRIs play the dual role of promoting and protecting rights at the 
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domestic level, assisting governments in key efforts to address adequately a range of rights-
related challenges, such as the protection of fundamental rights, and social and political rights. 
Since then, widespread support has triggered a norm cascade on a global scale, with NHRIs 
increasing from twenty structures before 1992 to approximately 130 NHRIs in 2015.30 The UN 
played an important role in the global diffusion of NHRIs, primarily through the formulation 
the Paris Principles and a transnational network that offers monitoring and support mechanisms 
for peer members.  
Most academic research to date has explored why and how states decide to establish 
human rights ombudsmen and commissions.31 Additionally, a number of academic articles and 
institutional reports investigate the effectivness of NHRIs in carrying out their mandates and 
improving human rights outcomes.32 Our data from a global dataset of peace agreements 
indicates their key role in conflict and post-conflict processes, yet our understanding of the 
roles that NHRIs play in conflict and post-conflict areas is very limited. As institutional reports 
of activity indicate, NHRIs may help lay the groundwork for a phase of transitional justice by 
monitoring and recording violations during periods of conflict and transitional periods.33 
NHRIs can also investigate allegations of violations and provide remedies to victims, promote 
respect for the rule of law, and strengthen democracy and sustainable peace,34 but the 
effectiveness of these activities and how NHRIs are built into the implementation of human 
rights provisions in peace agreements has not been thoroughly explored. The next section sets 
out our findings of how national, regional, and international human rights institutions are used 
in peace agreements. We examine both the type of institution and the activities it is mandated 






Mapping out human rights institutions in peace agreements 
 
We draw on the PA-X peace agreements database and use a qualitative content analysis of 
agreements with provisions for human rights promotion and protection through formal 
institutions. According to PA-X, a peace agreement is broadly defined as any formal, public 
document that is produced after discussions with parties to the conflict and agreed by at least 
some of them.35 The PA-X database encompasses a broad conception of human rights and 
applies it to human rights institutions. An agreement with an NHRI is conceived as any 
agreement with a provision for a national body that monitors human rights and includes 
provisions that establishes a new NHRI or institutions for promoting democracy, human rights, 
and equality.36 Agreements with regional or international human rights institutions either 
mention new regional or international human rights bodies mandated to monitor human rights 
and/or, more often than not, reference an existing institution.37  
 We found that 502 of the 1,518 agreements in the PA-X database contain general 
references or rhetorical commitments to human rights or rule of law.38 Beyond these general 
commitments, PA-X also codes for references to specific human rights categories, such as civil 
and political rights, socio-economic rights, or detention procedures. Additionally, PA-X codes 
for references to mechanisms that will define human rights standards, specifically human rights 
frameworks, and structures that will support human rights, specifically national as well as 
regional and international human rights institutions.39 There are vast differences in how peace 
agreements approach human rights, both in terms of the commitments they make and the 
mechanisms through which the provisions are implemented. This study focuses on one 
particular category to support the implementation of human rights provisions, human rights 
institutions, as understanding their use in peace agreements provides valuable insights into 
when and how human rights mechanisms that operate at different levels of the global system 
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are included in processes of peacebuilding and the implementation of peace. There are 44 peace 
agreements mentioning of international and regional human rights institutions and 99 peace 
agreements referencing national human rights institutions as formal safeguards for rights 
prevention in the post-conflict transition (Tables 1 and 2). There is some overlap between these 
two groups, and in total we analyse a total of 126 peace agreements from 1990 through 2015 
that mention international, regional and/or national human rights institutions.  
According to the principles of qualitative content analysis, systematic text analysis is 
based on the creation of categories of text that are initially identified and then revisited. Such 
categories consist of ‘idea clusters’ that share features and resist reductive essentialization.40  
Textual data was coded in two main stages. First, text was coded according to the thematic 
category that was the most appropriate, grouping references to human rights institutions in one 
of three main categories: international, regional, and national institutions. Coding was done 
manually by two coders and followed the same set scheme for all three types of institutions, 
seeking to capture the main roles that these institutions were given in peace agreements. 
Second, coders identified the main types of roles for each type of institution in peace 
agreements (Tables 1-3). To ensure that our coding was systematic, we carried out inter-coder 
reliability tests. The inter-coder reliability test produced a coefficient of agreement of 0.85, 
which is in the high range of acceptable agreement.41  
 
Table 1: The main roles of international human rights institutions  
included in peace agreements 
International institutions  
Monitoring human rights 19 
Collaboration with NHRI 8 
Make recommendations on human rights and 
promote human rights 
7 
Establish local observatories/ offices 4 
Investigate human rights 4 
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Collaboration/ participation with truth 
commissions/ commissions of inquiry 
2 
Collaboration/ participation with ceasefire 
commission 
2 
Observe or participate in human rights processes 
(conferences or administrative assistance) 
1 
*There are 40 peace agreements that reference international human rights institutions. Some peace 
agreements stipulate that these institutions undertake multiple functions. Some agreements also 
mention national, regional, and international human rights institutions or some combination.  
 
 
Table 2: The main roles of regional human rights institutions  
included in peace agreements 
Regional institutions  
Observe or participate in human rights processes 
(conferences or administrative assistance) 
6 
Monitoring human rights 5 
Establish local observatories/ offices 2 
Make recommendations on human rights and 
promote human rights 
2 
Investigate human rights 2 
Collaboration/ participation with truth 
commissions/ commissions of inquiry 
2 
Collaboration/ participation with ceasefire 
commission 
1 
*There are 16 peace agreements that reference regional human rights institutions. Some peace 
agreements stipulate that these institutions undertake multiple functions. Some agreements also 
mention national, regional, and international human rights institutions or some combination.  
 
Table 3: The main roles of national human rights institutions  
included in peace agreements 
National human rights institutions: Roles  
Establishment/creation of NHRI 73 
Monitoring and reporting on human rights 
situation on the ground 
47 
Human rights protection (broadly) 29 
Create or implement new legislation 29 
Specialised or local rights protection 27 
Advise government on human rights and peace 26 
Educate and inform communities about human 
rights 
21 
Human rights promotion (broadly) 20 
Contribute to creation of new institutions as part 
of peace process 
11 
Participates in ceasefire 1 
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*There are 99 peace agreements that reference national human rights institutions. Some peace 
agreements stipulate that these institutions undertake multiple functions. Some agreements also mention 
national, regional, and international human rights institutions or some combination. 
 
 
Analysis and discussion: broad trends in the data 
Of the 126 agreements we analysed, the first settlement to mention the creation of an NHRI 
was the Acuerdo Gobierno Nacional-EPL y PCC – ML, Labores, Belmira, Antioquia in 
Colombia, dated 28th September 1990. The first peace agreement to mention a regional 
institution mandated with human rights implementation and monitoring was the Statement of 
Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Carrington-
Cutiliero Plan of March 1992), dated 18th March 1992, which mentioned that representatives 
of the European Commission would take an active part in the establishment of a human rights 
monitoring commission in the aftermath of the conflict. The first agreement to mention the 
involvement of an international organisation – the UN – in monitoring human rights is the 
Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations on 
Cambodia Incorporating the Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodia Conflict, dated 28th November 1990.  
 The largest group of human rights institutions mentioned in the 126 peace agreements 
we coded are human rights commissions and ombudsmen with national and local remits of 
human rights promotion and protection. International human rights institutions were mentioned 
in 40 agreements, regional human rights institutions were mentioned in 16 agreements, and 
national human rights institutions are mentioned in 99 agreements. The bodies classified as 
international human rights institutions consist of various UN bodies, including the UN Security 
Council, OHCHR, and UN monitoring teams attached to peacekeeping missions. Regional 
human rights institutions were used in several regions, notably Europe, the Americas, and 
Africa. For example, in Europe, the presence of the OSCE is considered central to the early 
stages of human rights monitoring and support for the creation of domestic institutions 
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mandated to promote and protect human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina.42 In what follows, 
we will present in greater detail the specific roles that peace agreements have granted each type 
of human rights institution. We will offer also a discussion of these findings, situating them in 
existing scholarship.  
 
National human rights institutions as pivotal actors in peace processes  
NHRIs are the most prevalent type of institution to which participating parties in peace 
agreements turn, to secure the implementation of human rights in a post-conflict setting. Our 
analysis has found that peace agreements from 1990 until 2015 make greater reference to 
NHRIs compared to regional and international human rights institutions and have assigned 
them a total of 10 different types of broadly defined roles in a post-conflict setting (Table 3). 
The most prevalent mention of NHRIs focuses on the need to establish new domestic bodies 
in post-conflict settings in which no such institution existed at the time the peace agreement 
was signed. However, some peace agreements go further and mandate that new or existing 
NHRIs carry out specific tasks.  
 Whether they recommend the establishment of new human rights bodies or they 
mandate an expansion of existing ombudsmen, the majority of peace agreements make written 
provisions to endow these institutions with powers to operate domestically in collaboration 
with national and local government and international organisations. They can suggest to 
national governments new legislation that ensures the promotion and protection of human 
rights. When other new institutions are needed, to secure the implementation of specialised 
rights and the consolidation of democracy, NHRIs can make such recommendations to 
government and can support their establishment and operations. Additionally, they can offer 
specialised advice to governments about the importance of human rights for peace and also of 
committing to ratifying and implementing regional and international human rights treaties. A 
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2001 agreement to address conflict in Afghanistan provides an example of an NHRI provision. 
It mandates that the Interim Administration establish, “an independent Human Rights 
Commission, whose responsibilities will include human rights monitoring, investigation of 
violations of human rights, and development of domestic human rights institutions”.43 The role 
peace agreements ascribe to NHRIs again demonstrate how national frameworks are prioritised 
for implementation of human rights even while they draw on international support and human 
rights treaties to shape their institutional development and approach to human rights promotion 
and protection.   
Moreover, NHRIs can play important promotional roles in society at large. In addition 
to monitoring rights violations on the ground, handling individual complaints and reporting on 
them to the public and international fora, a large number of peace agreements make provisions 
to endow NHRIs with the powers to educate the government and the public on human rights. 
Although collaboration with NHRIs is a key element in securing the protection of rights in 
transitional societies, peace agreements offer a wider scope of activity for regional and global 
institutions involved in human rights implementation after conflict. The variety of roles 
assigned to NHRIs by peace agreements is indicative of how NHRIs can provide institutional 
support for continued mediation of conflict-related issues. In many conflicts, parties may not 
be able to reach an agreement on difficult issues, such as accountability for crimes committed 
during the conflict or return of displaced populations. NRHIs create an institutional space 
where these discussions can continue to take place throughout a longer transition period as trust 
is gradually built and societies begin to recover.44 
 It is of course important to note that conflict parties endorsing the creation of an NHRI 
do not necessarily succeed to establish an independent and effective institution in the post-
conflict phase. Domestic commitment to human rights implementation can be weak, and 
conflict parties can agree to create an NHRI as a strategy to signal their intention to comply 
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with the terms of the agreement and then lack follow-through. On the other hand, the 
establishment of a new NHRI can also be seen as a marker of national sovereignty and 
commitment to human rights at the national level. Its inclusion in a peace agreement can signal 
the intention of the conflict parties  to take human rights matters ‘into their own hands’ and 
lead the peace process implementation. As intermediaries between international institutions 
and local communities, NHRIs can play a dual role of, on the one hand, advancing liberal 
democratic norms at the local level and, on the other hand, of helping post-conflict national 
governments to assert their sovereignty by supporting the establishment of a domestic 
institution with a human rights mandate rather than relying exclusively on international support 
in the post-conflict stage. 
 
International human rights institutions as key drivers of peace processes 
Our analysis identified eight main roles for international human rights institutions (Table 1). 
The main roles assigned to international human rights institutions in peace agreements are 
monitoring human rights, collaborating with the NHRI, making recommendations, 
investigating human rights abuses, establishing local offices, and/or collaborating with 
ceasefire or reconciliation commissions. It is unusual for international human rights institutions 
to have primary responsible for the implementation of human rights provisions. There are 
exceptions to this, notably Cambodia as the case study will show, but they primarily work 
within a larger context that includes local and national human rights institutions. In Colombia, 
for instance, a 2000 agreement stated that “the presence and activity of national and 
international organisations and agencies for the defence and promotion of human rights will be 
permitted, subject to coordination between the parties”.45 This provision is within a broader 
section that seeks to create human rights groups in communities, make commitments on 
particular human rights issues, and explicitly allow for the work of the International Red Cross. 
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In Kenya, a 2008 agreement calls for the UN and AU to provide the Kenya Commission of 
Inquiry with information on crimes committed during post-election violence, make the 
information public, and provide support to the Commission.46 The agreement does not provide 
specifics on the support needed, but it does highlight the important supporting role that regional 
and global institutions will be playing to facilitate the Commission’s activities.  
PA-X data shows that peace agreements mention a range of international organisations 
as important actors a post-conflict setting – OHCHR, international criminal tribunals, UN 
representatives, UN representatives from other agencies, UN peacekeeping missions, special 
rapporteurs. These actors most often play a supplemental or complementary role. Our analysis 
finds that peace agreements make provisions for the creation of dedicated national and local 
human rights commissions and, importantly, they embed them in a network of diverse regional 
and international institutions to offer them support. For instance, the Lomé Agreement to end 
conflict in Sierra Leone created a Human Rights Commission that could seek technical and 
material assistance from the “UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African 
Commissioner of Human and People’s Rights, and other relevant international 
organisations”.47 While peace agreements do not to specify in great detail the roles of 
international and regional human rights institutions, they often acknowledge the key role that 
these transnational actors play in supporting peace implementation processes and democratic 
transitions. They also base human rights standards on regional and international frameworks. 
In our estimation, the broader focus of most peace agreements is to specify the national and 
local institutional parameters for human rights promotion and protection using international 
guidelines and position international and regional institutions to offer material and technical 





Regional human rights institutions as supporters of peace processes 
Despite being important actors in conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilisation more 
generally, our analysis finds that peace agreements generally grant regional institutions the 
least prominent role in human rights promotion and protection. In the few instances where 
regional human rights institutions were formally utilised in peace agreements they were tasked 
with monitoring human rights, establishing local offices, observing human rights processes, 
making recommendations, investigating human rights, and/or collaborating with the ceasefire 
commission. Out of a total of 16 agreements that mention regional human rights bodies, 11 
include them alongside international human rights institutions. 
 Two examples of regional organisations in a peace agreement are the OSCE in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as well as the OAU in the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. First, the 
UN Security Council calling upon the OSCE along with international organisations to closely 
monitoring human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNSC Resolution 1088, “calls 
upon the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate fully with the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, the OSCE, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and other intergovernmental and regional human rights missions or organisations to 
closely monitor the human right situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.48 Second, the OAU 
consulted with the conflict parties in Ethiopia and Eritrea and recommended a framework 
agreement where, “in order to contribute to the establishment of a climate of confidence, the 
OAU, in collaboration with the United Nations, deploys a team of Human Rights Monitors in 
both countries”.49 These two examples adhere to the trend of regional and international human 
rights bodies being mentioned in tandem. When regional human rights bodies are mentioned 
separately, it is often for a specific task. For instance, in Honduras, the Inter-American Institute 
of Human Rights is mandated to preside over the Truth Commission,50 and in South Sudan, the 
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agreement stipulates that individuals identified by the AU Commission of Inquiry for South 
Sudan as having committed atrocities cannot participate in the transitional government.51 
 
Comparative analysis 
The human rights bodies that are the most prevalent in the 126 peace agreements with 
provisions for human rights institutions are NHRIs, including human rights ombudsmen and 
commissions, followed by international organisations with human rights mandates; whereas 
regional organisations figure much less prominently. Without a doubt, the human rights actors 
with the strongest presence at the negotiating table are international organisations, such as the 
UN Security Council, the OHCHR and the UN monitoring teams attached to peacekeeping 
missions. Motivated by the implementation of peace through the creation of institutional 
frameworks that promote democracy and liberalism, international institutions seek to put in 
place domestic institutions that advance liberal democratic norms and assist with their 
implementation on the ground.52 They may also seek to include NHRIs that have a provision 
for international financial and technical assistance to ensure international bodies can remain 
engaged in the implementation of the peace agreement.53 
 UN-based agencies with human rights mandates advance liberal democratic solutions 
to the resolution of military conflict by integrating the creation of NHRIs in the terms of peace 
agreements, which may help to explain their prevalence in peace agreements compared to 
international and regional human rights institutions. As sole independent bodies charged with 
the promotion and protection of human rights at the domestic level, NHRIs act as regulatory 
intermediaries54 between the UN and national governments. In this sense, they represent the 
international institutions’ response to the compliance gap in human rights, as their ‘local 
solution’ to providing oversight of the implementation of governments’ human rights 
obligations endorsed by peace agreements. In most cases of early transition from violent 
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conflict to peace, NHRIs require the financial and capacity support of international institutions 
and more experienced peer NHRIs in other countries. As is the case with the NHRI in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, international support continued for the first decade of institutional existence. 
Ultimately, the UN’s longer-term vision is that NHRIs will consolidate as fully functional 
national bodies that work independently from national governments while they receive support 
from their executives and maintain good working relationships with them.55  
 Peace agreements grant human rights institutions specific tasks aimed at improving 
human rights outcomes after the cessation of conflict. Even when the responsibility of carrying 
out these tasks are shared by some institutions, the nature of human rights duties does show 
variation across type of institution and also over time. While international institutions and 
NHRIs are granted powers to monitor human rights and are expected to work in partnership, 
their roles in monitoring processes are different. More often than not, international institutions 
have the strongest presence in the human rights-focused work during the cessation of the 
conflict, while only very few regional institutions are granted any human rights responsibilities 
in the text of peace agreements. In other words, human rights monitoring is ensured by more 
than one type of institution present on the ground, but international institutions tend to exercise 
their monitoring duties much more during the first years of post-conflict transition. They also 
coordinate and assist with the creation of national observatories and NHRIs, with the view to 
consolidating their position in the domestic institutional architecture and entrusting them with 
full monitoring and reporting duties on the in-country human rights situation. As the case 
studies will demonstrate, despite their prevalence in peace agreements, the persistence of these 
formal institutional solutions in the success of these institutional solutions, be they short-term 
or long-term, varies significantly from country to country. Years after a peace agreement is 
signed, NHRIs show varying degrees of independence from their governments and from 
international actors. For instance, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission acted with 
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greater independence from government from the very start and has carried out its 
responsibilities effectively since inception. At the same time, the Colombian Defensor took 
longer to consolidate itself as a human rights body after conflict, becoming one of the most 
effective NHRIs in the region.56 
 All three types of human rights institutions specified in peace agreements have 
promotional and advisory powers in their post-conflict mandated duties. Peace agreements 
indicate that international and regional bodies are actively involved in supporting local actors 
and national governments in the transition away from violent conflict. However, once 
established and functional, NHRIs are meant to work with governments to design human rights 
strategies, advise them in the process of signing the ratifying international human rights 
treaties, and passing relevant national legislation. In other words, the creation of NHRIs is a 
measure to safeguard the sustainability of human rights promotion and the protection of human 
rights even after the end of the immediate post-conflict period. If the ultimate goal is to aid 
with the consolidation of democracy and the respect of human rights after the end of conflict, 
NHRIs represent the strongest institutional safeguard that peace agreements put in place to 
oversee this process domestically and locally. 
 
Case Studies 
In this section, we present two case studies, which help us offer a more in-depth analysis of 
how and why particular institutions were included in the peace agreements as well as the 
intended impact these institutions had on implementation of the human rights provisions. Given 
the predominant role that national bodies play in peace agreements, we have selected two 
country cases that are similar with respect to the inclusion of regional and/or international 
institutions in human rights promotion and protection in a post-conflict setting. At the same 
time, the two cases differ as one of them does not make provisions for the creation of a national 
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human rights institution. The selection of the two cases is based on variation across the 
institutional provisions for human rights implementation at the domestic level, allowing us to 
gather comparative insights into the different roles that national, regional and international 
institutions can be granted in peace processes..  
 The case studies of Cambodia and Bosnia Herzegovina allow us to trace causal 
processes that explain the roles that international and national human rights institutions can 
play in the implementation of peace agreements and in the efforts to create quality and lasting 
peace. They also allow us to understand more about why either international or national 
institutions were chosen in a particular context. A highly internationalised peace process, in 
Cambodia, the 1991 peace agreement relies only on international institutions to define the 
safeguards for implementing peace and integrating human rights in the post-conflict transition 
process. Whereas the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(the ‘Dayton Peace Accords’) in 1995 was an accord with strong international presence but 
stipulated the creation of a human rights ombudsman as the main domestic instrument ensuring 
human rights promotion and protection after the end of the conflict. The Institution of the 
Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina owes its early existence and mandate 
expansions to the financial and capacity support of international institutions, like the OSCE 
and the Council of Europe; however, the Ombudsman’s has grown stronger and more formally 
independent from international support in recent years, despite overall lack of political will to 
implement recommendations by the Human Rights Ombudsman and to recognise human rights 
as domestic norms that are part and parcel of peace implementation and state building.  
 
Cambodia 
In the case of Cambodia, international human rights implementation mechanisms were 
mandated because of the history of atrocities and continuing divisions amongst the conflict 
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parties that necessitated a neutral actor to implement the peace agreement. The Khmer Rouge 
government came to power in April 1975 and controlled the country until January 1979. During 
this period, the government committed atrocities and human rights abuses against wide swaths 
of Cambodian society. Vietnam invaded Cambodia on 9 January 1979 and then installed a 
regime known as the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).57 After Vietnam’s intervention, 
world powers lined up to support sides in the conflict. China, the United States (US), and states 
in Southeast Asia supported the Khmer Rouge while the Soviet Union supported the Vietnam-
backed PRK.58  
 There were limited, unsuccessful attempts to resolve the conflict in the early 1980s. 
International negotiations that involved the conflict parties, the UN, and major regional and 
international powers began in Jakarta in 1988 and then moved to Paris. However, the 
negotiations in August 1989 ended without a peace agreement when the parties could not 
resolve the central question on power-sharing.59 After the failure of the first round of talks, the 
Permanent Five (P5) members of the UNSC met to outline the parameters of an agreement to 
resolve both the internal and internationalized aspects of the conflict. The underlying approach 
was to, “enable the Cambodian people to determine their own political future through free and 
fair elections organized and conducted by the United Nations in a neutral political environment 
with full respect for the national sovereignty of Cambodia”.60 
 The P5 statement led to a second round of negotiations in Paris in 1990 leading to the 
Comprehensive Settlement Agreement in 1991. The overall structure of the agreement is 
important for understanding the institutions put in place to monitor the human rights provisions. 
The agreement created the Supreme National Council (SNC) as the legitimate source of 
authority in Cambodia throughout the transition period, and then the SNC delegated all 
necessary powers to the UN to ensure implementation of the agreement.61 In this way, the 
agreement sought to guard Cambodia’s independence and sovereignty through the creation of 
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the SNC while also bringing in a neutral, outside actor to implement the provisions of the 
agreement. Guarding Cambodia’s independence was necessary because of the history of 
outside actors in the conflict, and a neutral actor to implement was necessary because of the 
continuing divisions in the country.  
 The parties to the agreement also recognized that Cambodia’s history of atrocities and 
divisions required special measures to protect human rights. The signatories agreed that all 
people in Cambodia should enjoy the “rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments”.62 The UN Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was given responsibility for fostering respect for human 
rights during the transition period, and after the end of the transition period, the UN 
Commission on Human Rights was tasked with continuing to monitor the human rights 
situation and appoint a Special Rapporteur if needed.63 Specifically, UNTAC was tasked with 
“(a) the development and implementation of a programme of human rights education to 
promote respect for and understanding of human rights; (b) general human rights oversight 
during the transitional period; and (c) the investigation of human rights complaints and where 
appropriate, corrective action”.64 
 UNTAC was deployed from February 1992 to September 1993. Its overall mandate 
was to implement the Comprehensive Settlement Agreement. To fulfil the human rights 
provisions, UNTAC undertook activities in three areas. First, it advocated for the SNC to abide 
by international human rights standards and reviewed existing judicial and penal systems in 
accordance with international standards. The SNC subsequently ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment of Punishment, and other international human rights conventions in 1992. Second, 
UNTAC conducted human rights education campaigns. Educational materials, such as posters 
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and leaflets, were distributed throughout the country, and training on human rights was 
integrated into the Cambodian education system and into some university curriculum. UNTAC 
also worked extensively with civil society organisations to provide training, support, and 
material and financial assistance. Finally, UNTAC investigated human rights complaints that 
occurred during the transition period and deployed human rights officers to provinces across 
Cambodia, although UNTAC human rights officers were not granted access to all areas, 
notably those controlled by the Khmer Rouge.65  
 UNTAC had some success in improving the human rights situation in Cambodia, but 
its impact was limited due to a lack of enforcement powers, being denied access to areas 
controlled by certain groups, and an extremely small staff dedicated exclusively to human 
rights issues.66 However, even after the end of the UNTAC mandate, the UN left a legacy of 
UN institutions in Cambodia to continue to address human rights concerns. The UN Centre for 
Human Rights in Cambodia was established by a resolution adopted by the UN Commission 
of Human Rights on 19 February 1993. The UN Centre was to continue implement a program 
of human rights education, support human rights groups in Cambodia, and assist the new 
Cambodian government with meeting its human rights obligations though a number of 
initiatives.67 Furthermore, a UN Special Rapporteur with a country-specific mandate for 
Cambodia was established in 1993 pursuant to the provisions in the Paris Agreements.68 The 
Rapporteur was mandated to guide the UN human rights presence in Cambodia, assist the 
Government of Cambodia to protect human rights, and report to the UN General Assembly on 
the situation in Cambodia.69 The mandate of the Special Rapporteur was extended in September 
2017 for a further two years.70  
 The mandate-holders who served as Special Rapporteurs faced many issues in their 
roles. For instance, there is very little guidance from the UN on the role and procedures for 
country-specific mandate holders. The Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-
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holders of the Human Rights Council was released in 2007 but still provides only vague 
direction, particularly for mandate-holders working in post-conflict states. There are also 
resource constraints in terms of funding and staff and limited support from the UN Human 
Rights Council (or the predecessor Human Rights Commission) to implement the Rapporteur’s 
recommendations.71 Despite these challenges, the various Special Rapporteurs under the 
Cambodia mandate have contributed to establishing the Khmer Rouge Tribunal to bring 
perpetrators of past atrocities to account, developing legislation to protect and promote human 
rights, and supporting Cambodian human rights non-governmental organisations.72 
 Overall the case study of Cambodia demonstrates when international human rights 
institutions are needed as well as the strengths and weaknesses of these types of institutions. 
Due to the internationalized nature of the conflict, history of atrocities, and continuing divisions 
within the country, the Comprehensive Political Settlement mandated an international actor to 
implement the agreement. When it came to human rights provisions, specific UN bodies were 
mandated to undertake particular tasks to safeguard and promote human rights. Even though 
an international institution implemented the human rights provisions, the UN continually 
worked with local organisations and pushed for national implementation of human rights 
treaties, again showing the importance of human rights implementation at the local and national 
levels. The major strength of the UN was that it was an outside, neutral party, but it also had 
restricted access due to lack of buy-in from some parties at the national level and limited 
resources.  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The most devastating European conflict since World War II, the Bosnian War led to the 
displacement of over 2 million people and an estimated loss of 100,000 lives.73 After years of 
unsuccessful peace efforts, world powers gathered in the Contact Group applied intense 
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pressure on the leaders of the three sides to attend the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio. The 
conference took place from 1–21 November 1995, under the leadership of US Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher and negotiator Richard Holbrooke, in addition to a number of 
different international representatives, such as the EU Special Representative Carl Bildt and 
the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov. The main participants from the region 
were the President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević (representing the Bosnian 
Serb interests), President of Croatia Franjo Tuđman, and President of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović with his Foreign Minister Muhamed Šaćirbeg.  
 The Dayton Accord includes an Agreement on Human Rights, Annex 6,74 which lays 
the legal and institutional foundation for the implementation of human rights as part of peace 
building. The signatories commit to respecting the rights and freedoms provided in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
Protocols as well as a number of international human rights agreements stipulated in the 
Accord. Moreover, Article XIII of the Agreement calls for the need to promote and encourage 
the activities of non-governmental organisations and international organisations for the 
protection and promotion of human rights.75 Parties to the Agreement agreed to inviting the 
UN Commission for Human Rights, the OSCE, the UN Commissioner for Human Rights and 
other intergovernmental or regional human rights missions or organisations to monitor closely 
the human rights situation in the country, through the establishment of local offices and the 
support of observers and rapporteurs.76  
 In addition to treaty obligations, the parties consented to establish a Commission on 
Human Rights mandated to assist in honouring obligations under the Dayton Agreement. The 
newly minted Commission would consist of two parts – the Office of the Ombudsman and the 
Human Rights Chamber – with human rights investigative and monitoring powers. While the 
Ombudsman had powers of investigation and complaint handling, the Chamber had judicial 
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powers and would function as a human rights tribunal issuing legally binding decisions.77 
Although financially independent by design, with guaranteed support from the state of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Commission continued to be dependent on full financial and capacity 
support from the OSCE and other international bodies for over a decade after its inception.  
 To ensure independence from domestic political interference, the Office of the 
Ombudsman was established on the condition that institutional leadership would be 
international. The Dayton Agreement states that the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE would 
be in charge of appointing the ombudsman, after consultation with participating parties. In line 
with the Resolution 6 of the Council of Europe, the Human Rights Chamber would be 
composed of fourteen members, out of which four were to be appointed by the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, two by the Republika Srpska, and ten by the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe, after domestic consultations. The Law on the Ombudsman78 was 
adopted in 2000, and then amended in 2002 and 2006, to broaden the scope of mandated powers 
to encompass more promotional duties, change the institutional structure to streamline 
activities, and align the institution with the Paris Principles more generally. The Dayton Accord 
also recommends a transfer of institutional leadership from international organisations to 
institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina five years later. However, the Ombudsman continued 
to be led by internationally appointed Commission members for nearly a decade, in 2004, when 
ownership of the institution was fully transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 The increase in formal strength over the years has not been matched by an equivalent 
increase in institutional effectiveness. Arguably the most significant limitation to institutional 
effectiveness is the lack of political will to take into consideration, respond and implement the 
Ombudsman’s recommendations. Although public institutions’ responsiveness to the work of 
the Ombudsman has increased in recent years, the long-standing foreign ownership of the 
Human Rights Commission has decreased the overall level of trust in the relevance of the 
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institution in the socio-political context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite enjoying more 
widespread acceptance in recent years, human rights have historically not been regarded as 
inherently national values, but rather were considered more as part of a foreign liberal 
democratic agenda that seeks to shape domestic politics through the international development 
agenda.  
 The creation and consolidation of the Ombudsman office in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
offers a valuable example of how human rights governance in a post-conflict setting depends 
on the key involvement of all three types of formal institutions included in the peace agreement. 
Created by international and regional bodies in 1995, the Ombudsman was led by OSCE 
representatives with broad international support for over 10 years, when it was successfully 
transferred to national leadership. Although the NHRI has operated in a domestic environment 
that is relatively hostile to human rights, it has strengthened its powers over the years and has 
successfully garnered increasing support for its human rights promotion and protection 
activities from the government as well as the wider public. Importantly, it has been the sole 
body that has continued to grow over the years, mostly due to extensive international support. 
Other proposals included in the peace settlement, such as the establishment of entity human 
rights institutions, did not garner sufficient international support to be implemented. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the years, many comprehensive peace settlements have developed into complex 
agreements that aim not only to put an immediate end to violent conflict, but also to secure the 
implementation of sustainable peace and the transition to democracy, through including 
provisions to secure political inclusion, transitional justice as well as the promotion and 
protection of human rights. This is in line with a conception of peacebuilding that aims to 
promote positive peace through the institutionalisation of particular liberal norms. Existing 
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scholarship has significantly advanced our understanding of why human rights play important 
roles in peace agreements and conflict resolution more broadly,79 but most empirical evidence 
to date consists of single case studies or comparative small-n analyses.  
 This article seeks to contribute to existing scholarship by undertaking an original 
comparative analysis of the formal institutional provisions that peace agreements make for 
human rights promotion and protection after the end of violent conflict. Our multi-level 
analysis of peace agreement provisions for international, regional, and national institutions 
used textual data from the PA-X peace agreements database to generate original quantitative 
data by identifying and coding the different roles that peace agreements grant to human rights 
institutions and the different types of human rights institutions that are prescribed in 
agreements.  
 Our analysis seeks to contribute to the literature on peacebuilding and human rights 
showing that parties to peace agreements tend to turn primarily to NHRIs and, to a lesser extent, 
to international institutions with very limited use of regional institutions to ensure human rights 
monitoring, promotion and protection after the end of conflict. When mentioned, the main role 
of international and regional institutions is to take part in human rights monitoring when 
domestic context does not facilitate the creation of an NHRI and, when an NHRI can be 
established, to offer support to institutions with a human rights remit. We find that peace 
settlements seek to localise human rights norms through the creation of NHRIs, as the preferred 
formal safeguard for the domestic implementation of rights, monitoring government behaviour 
with respect to human rights and shaping the domestic processes of peace stabilisation. When 
fully operational and independent from political interference, NHRIs can advise governments 
on national policies and their compliance with human rights and can assist with the process of 
national integration in the global community of liberal democratic states through the 
ratification of international human rights treaties. In other words, peace agreements seek to 
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make formal institutional arrangements that can guarantee more sustainable peace through a 
transition away from conflict and in the direction of liberal democracy.  
 This study has sought to enhance our understanding of how human rights institutions 
at different levels of the global system are used in peace agreements, while the two case studies 
from Bosnia Herzegovina and Cambodia show why particular institutions were chosen for 
those contexts and how the use of these institutions impacted on the promotion of human rights 
in different post-conflict contexts. In Cambodia, the highly internationalised conflict and past 
atrocities necessitated the presence of an international human rights institution, but this 
institution also had limitations on where it could access and limited buy-in from national actors. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, an NHRI that was strongly supported by regional and international 
actors was established and over the course of a decade evolved into an independent body that 
is gaining support. Without a doubt, further analysis is needed to fully understand the 
institutional mechanisms that peace agreements put in place to safeguard human rights 
implementation after the end of conflict. With our data, however, we seek to advance our 
knowledge of human rights and peacebuilding, by offering systematic insights into the complex 
provisions that peace agreements make for formal institutions to carry out human rights 
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